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sible to have a jury instruction indicating that the jurors were not to
be swayed by sympathy or passion as long as they were still able to
consider legitimate mitigating factors. Conversely, in a situation
similar to the one in Gathers a jury should not be swayed or influ-
enced by emotion or sympathy for the victim or victim's family, but
instead should focus on the acts and intentions of the defendant.
Upon review the Court concluded that evidence regarding
factors about which the accused was unaware and that did not
influence his decision to kill were inadmissible during the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. Therefore, the Court held that the death
sentence must be reversed and the defendant granted a new sentenc-
ing hearing. Gathers at 2211. It should be noted that Justice White,
who filed the dissenting opinion in Booth, filed a separate concurring
opinion in Gathers. Justice White's concurrence was apparently
based solely on his refusal to overrule the Court's prior holding in
Booth. Id.
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. In the dissent Justice
O'Connor argued that the holding of the majority was a broad
reading of Booth that effectively barred the admission of any
evidence pertaining to the victim. Gathers at 2212. This assertion is
made in spite of the majority's statement that, "Our opinion in Booth
... left open the possibility that the kind of information contained in
victim impact statements could be admissible if it'related directly to
the circumstances of the crime."' Id. at 2211. Thus, while limiting the
type of evidence pertaining to the victim and circumstances under
which it is admissible, the majority opinion has not totally barred the
admission of such evidence.
It should be noted that even prior to the holding in Gathers,
Virginia law barred prosecutorial commentary on the "harm" the
accused's acts caused the victim's family. Dingus v. Commonwealth,
153 Va. 846, 149 S.E. 414 (1929). In Dingus, the prosecutor stated
that if it were not for the act of the defendant, the victim's wife would
not be a widow. Id. at 850. In reversing the verdict of guilty and
remanding for a new trial, the Court in Dingus stated, "Whatever
liberties are permitted to counsel... to appeal for mercy for their
clients ... the prosecutor has no corresponding liberty... the
Commonwealth does not rely either upon prejudice or sympathy for
the enforcement of its laws." Id. This bar on prosecutorial commen-
tary is effective, despite the fact that such evidence may be admis-
sible during the guilt phase to prove, for example, that the victim was
not the aggressor.
As stated previously, the Gathers error occured during the
prosecution's closing arguments offered in the sentencing phase of
Gathers' trial. Attorneys representing capital defendants in Virginia
should consider that the longstanding custom of not objecting to an
opponent's closing argument is not, as Gathers demonstrates,
applicable in a capital proceeding. The arguments of the Common-
wealth Attorney may also be objectionable on additional grounds.
(See, discussion of Caldwell v. Mississippi in the summary of Dugger
v. Adams-[this issue]). Further, capital defense attorneys should
recognize that failure to contemporaneously object to the arguments
of the Commonwealth Attorney could effectively bar appellate
review of potential Constitutional errors.
Summary and analysis by: Thomas Marlowe
DUGGER v. ADAMS
109 S. Ct. 1211, 103 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1978 Adams was brought to trial for first-degree murder and
the state of Florida sought to impose the death penalty. At voir dire,
the trial judge informed the veniremen that their recommendations
were not binding on the court: "The Court is not bound by your
recommendation. ... You are merely an advisory group to me in
Phase Two. ... So that this conscience part of it as to whether or not
you're going to put the man to death or not, that is not your decision
to make.... 109 S. Ct. at 1213. "In addition, the judge interrupted
counsel's voir dire on two occasions to repeat that the court, not the
jury, was responsible for sentencing, and again instructed the jury to
that effect before it began its deliberations. Defense counsel did not
object at any point to these instructions." Id. Veniremembers
ultimately selected for the trial heard the judge's explanation of the
law at least once and several heard it more than once. Id. On direct
appeal and in his initial state and federal motions for habeas relief
Adams did not cite these instructions as error on either state or
federal grounds.
While Adams was still pursuing his first round of federal habeas
appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985), holding that "it
is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that
the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defen-
dant's death rests elsewhere". When his initial habeas motion failed,
Adams filed a second motion for postconviction relief in which he
challenged, for the first time, the statements of the trial judge on
Caldwell grounds. Adams, in this second motion, argued that "the
judge's instructions violated the Eighth Amendment by misinforming
the jury of its role under Florida law. According to respondent,
although the Florida death penalty statute provided that the jury's
recommendation was only advisory, the Florida Supreme Court had
held that a trial judge could only override the jury's verdict if the
facts were "so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ.'... Since the trial judge ... told the jurors that the
sentencing responsibility was solely his and failed to tell them that he
could override their verdict only under limited circumstances,
respondent argued, the judge misled the jury in violation of
Caldwell." Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1214, citing Tedder v. State, 322 So.
2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The Florida Supreme Court, on grounds that
Adams did not raise the argument on direct appeal, refused to address
the merits of the Caldwell argument, and in a second federal habeas
petition the District Court held the Caldwell claim to be procedurally
barred, and in the alternative, that it was without merit. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that "respondent's Caldwell claim 'was so
novel at the time of ... trial in ... 1978 and his sentencing and appeal
in early 1979 that its legal basis was not reasonably available at that
time'."Adams v. Wainwright, 816 F.2d 1493,1498 (llth Cir. 1987).
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court did not decide whether the
trial judge's action violated Caldwell due to its determination that
there was no acceptable excuse for Adams' failure to object to the
judge's action at trial and thereby give the Florida court a chance to
rule on the matter. As the 11 th Circuit decided, there is a recognized
excuse for failing to raise claims at trial and so preserve them on
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appeal if the legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available at
the time. However, the Supreme Court decided that since Adams had
not objected on the state law grounds available to him at trial under
the ruling in Tedder v. Florida, and where the state law objection was
a "necessary ingredient" of the subsequently available Caldwell
claim, the latter is now barred. 109 S. Ct. at 1217. The Adams Court
made it explicit that the holding did not imply that "...whenever a
defendant has any basis for challenging particular conduct as
improper, a failure to preserve that claim under state procedural law
bars any subsequently available claim arising out of the same
conduct." Id. at 1217. Still, the holding leaves open that possibility in
a given case where the basis for state and federal claims are closely
related.
ANALYSIS
This case illustrates once again that Virginia attorneys must read
all applicable state and federal law, make all appropriate objections
on all available state and federal grounds, and preserve them on direct
appeal. This is because of the difficulty imposed by habeas law. It is
important to note that, on certiorari, the State addressed only the
claim of procedural bar. Adamns, n.4 at 1215. The Court did not reach
the merits of Adams' Caldwell claim, id., but instead saw the issue as
one of exercising the Court's "equitable power to overlook respon-
dent's state procedural default." 109 S. Ct. at 1216 - 1217.
To address this "threshold" issue, the Court reviewed the
requirements set out in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct.
2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1977). Under Sykes, habeas petitioners must
show cause for the default and prejudice, i.e., a real possibility of a
different result, before federal courts will review claims found to be
procedurally defaulted by state courts.
The Caldwell holding in itself is worth noting by Virginia attor-
neys. Although the trial court is not likely to mislead the jury about
its role and responsibility, the Commonwealth's attorney in his
closing argument might do so. At that point it is the responsibility of
the defense to interrupt and object on Caldwell grounds.
Summary and analysis by: Thomas 0. Burkhalter
HILDWIN v. FLORIDA
109 S. Ct. 2055,104 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Petitioner Hildwin was convicted of first degree murder. The
jury returned a unanimous advisory verdict of death and the judge
imposed the death sentence. The trial judge, in imposing sentence,
found four aggravating circumstances which were set forth in writing
as required under Florida law. The jury made no specific finding as
to aggravating circumstances. Florida law requires that at least one
aggravating circumstance must be found before the death sentence
may be imposed. Petitioner argued before the Florida Supreme Court
"that the Florida capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth
Amendment because it permits the imposition of death without a
specific finding by the jury that sufficient aggravating circumstances
exist to qualify the defendant for capital punishment." Hildwin, 109
S. Ct. at 2056. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument
without discussion and Hildwin petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court.
HOLDING
The Sixth Amendment does not require that specific findings
authorizing the death sentence be made by a jury. Petitioner argued
before the Florida Supreme Court that the Sixth Amendment requires
a specific finding, by the jury, of aggravating factors support a
sentence of death. The Florida Supreme Court found this argument
meritless. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that in Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1984), it
had rejected any Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury trial on
sentencing issues. The Court also referred to McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1986), which
held that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing even
where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." Hildwin, 109
S. Ct. at 2057. "The existence of an aggravating factor ... is not an
element of the offense but ... is 'a sentencing factor that comes into
play only after the defendant has been found guilty."' Id.
ANALYSIS
Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(D), requires that a jury returning a
death sentence do so on a form specifying what aggravating factors
have been found. In Virginia, unlike Florida, the jury's determina-
tion is not advisory; a life sentence is binding upon the judge, and a
death sentence may be set aside only for good cause. Virginia's
statute, therefore, exceeds the Sixth Amendment requirements of
McMillan and Spaziano as cited in Hildwin. However, the Virginia
Supreme Court has held that a jury need not specify which aggravat-
ing factor it used where both factors could have been found. See
Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979); Hoke
v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d 595 (1989). A unani-
mous death verdict is all the Virginia Supreme Court has required,
despite the statutory requirement of unanimity as to aggravating
factors. Hildwin, therefore, does not foreclose a Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process challenge to the Virginia Supreme Court's
interpretation. In Clark and Hoke, the Supreme Court of Virginia
acknowledged a distinction between factors required to prove the
elements of an offense and factors affecting sentencing; objections to
the lack of specificity in the jury's findings were based on statutory
interpretation rather than the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court of Virginia noted that other courts construing similar
statutes treated the aggravating factors as a single unit. Clark at 213.
Hoke argued on appeal that no distinction was made between the
"future danger" and "vileness" predicates. The Virginia Supreme
Court found that the facts in the case were sufficient to support either
finding, id. at 316 - 317, and that since the jurors were unanimous in
their verdict of death for all three underlying felonies, Hoke's
argument was meritless.
Summary and analysis by: Thomas 0. Burkhalter
